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ABSTRACT 
 
The late emergence of national industries in Turkey in the 20th century created 
various challenges for the country’s development, including architecture and urbanization. 
With reference to Lefebvre’s notion that “politics” has the “privilege to embrace” the spheres 
of architecture, urbanism, planning, and the economy, this study analyzes the spread of the 
informal economy and informal gecekondu housing in Istanbul by making connections to the 
outcomes of the political and economic shifts in the post-World War II period in Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW 
In 2003, nearly 65 percent of Turkey’s total population of 67.8 million resided in 
urban areas.1 Yet, a significant 49 percent of the total population was involved with 
agriculture, while rates of industry and commerce were only 14 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively.2 Additional data for the year 2003 estimated that 42.6 percent of the urbanites 
in Turkey were living in slums.3 Asymmetrically, some cities in Turkey have experienced an 
uncontrolled growth and sprawl via construction of unauthorized informal buildings termed 
‘gecekondu.’4
                                                 
1 Bülent Dinçer, Metin Özalsan and Taner Kavasoğlu, İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik 
Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması [in English: The Survey of Socio-Economic Development Rankings of the 
Cities and Regions], p.101, (Ankara: DPT, 2003) 
 Due to gecekondu dwellers’ importance in the political elections, most of 
gecekondu houses were pardoned and even given legal titles by the authorities. Gecekondu 
houses often occupied public lands or lands in dispute which were in the proximity to 
highroads, factories, and the urban centers. However, only half a century ago the gecekondu 
rate of the urban population was only one tenth of its current condition. Hence, in light of 
previous studies on economic development and production of space, this study analyzes the 
motives behind the urban spatial transformation as an imprint of the social dynamics of 
Turkey with a special focus on Istanbul and the period of 1945-1960. It is first argued that 
rural to urban migration followed uneven regional development, which triggered a 
“marginalized” economic sector for the displaced workers. Second, this thesis maintains that 
2 Ibid. 
3 This rate was derived from the 2003 UN-HABITAT case studies and an averaging of dozens of 
diverse sources Davis mentioned to be too numerous to cite. Mike Davis, “The Prevalence of Slums” in Planet 
of Slums, p.24, (New York: Verso, 2006). 
4 “Gecekondu” may be directly translated from Turkish to English as “put at night,” meaning a 
dwelling built “over-night.” It is a term widely used in Turkish to describe illegal squatter housing. 
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it was the capitalist shift in the economic development model of Turkey combined with 
foreign aid from 1945s onward that caused rapid growth in gecekondu housing as a result of 
rural to urban migration.   
 
Introduction 
 
Drivers waiting for hours in congested traffic, passengers waiting in long queues at 
bus-stops, residents waiting for electricity blackouts or water shortages to end, students 
Figure 1- Congested traffic in the European landing of the Bosphorus Bridge. Photo by Gizem Akdoğan. 
 3 
 
waiting in their crowded school yard to be picked up by their shuttle to be transported back 
their distant homes, the retired and elderly waiting in long lines for hours to get their social 
security funds from the banks is a reality for the inhabitants of Istanbul and other major 
Turkish cities. The most intriguing observation that can be made regarding these daily scenes 
is the coexistence of everyday actors who symbolize different identities and different ways of 
life in the city. The street vendors selling pastries, flowers or toys accompany the hungry and 
exhausted drivers waiting in the traffic, the sellers behind the cotton candy carts choose 
where to stand strategically to attract young students before they get into their shuttles, and 
there can easily be a desperate pair of eyes that watch over the people withdrawing money 
from the bank which in some cases ends up as a robbery that is reported on prime time news. 
The observation of coexistence of different actors is not only limited to spontaneous 
daily life interactions, but such urban scenes complicate the differentiation between the 
formal (institutionalized) and informal (spontaneous) activities. Indeed, the city includes 
various degrees of informal activities where a person that represents or works within the 
formal sector might be involved in informal activities and a person associated with informal 
sector may be involved with formal activities. For example, even if they work in the formal 
sector, the buyers from a street vendor become part of that “informality” as much as the 
street vendor himself, because both sides are involved in an “informal” exchange. Such 
ambiguity in the degrees of informality is not restricted to people’s exchanges but can 
include institutions as well. For instance, in Kuştepe -an Istanbul neighborhood that borders 
an area with the well-maintained skyscrapers and shopping malls with luxurious residential 
units nearby- the Municipality of Şişli developed an urban service where some housing units 
in the neighborhood that did not have municipal water supply were periodically provided 
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with drinkable water via mobile water tanks, which are known to be part of the informal 
economy. Another example of the indulgence of institutions in informal activities is done by 
the Municipality of Beyoğlu in Istanbul, which is the first municipality modified from 
Western models. During its administration in the 1980s, a roof addition was made to its own 
19th century historical building by circumventing building codes and regulations. Hence, the 
ambiguity between being “formal” and “informal” in Turkey includes people, institutions, 
within various socio-economic classifications.  
Even though formal and informal activities cannot be easily differentiated in daily 
practices, people tend to categorize people and places in the city according to physical 
qualities or representations that they mentally associate with informality. Thus, it is those 
(abstracted) mental representations of informality that exclusively associate the problems of 
informality to poverty and the urban poor, hence generating hatred/condemnation towards 
these communities. Needless to say, this is generated due to the limited understanding of the 
conditions of the urban poor and their marginalization within the capitalist world cycle. 
Whether practiced by members of a concentrated power group or by the masses, the 
problem of urban economic and residential informality attached to the major cities remains as 
a burden to all members of society, especially in a city such as Istanbul where the city is 
divided by the Bosphorus Strait. For example, when the unauthorized skyscraper, the Sky-
Cage,5
                                                 
5 The Sky-Cage is the popular name given to an international hotel chain’s building in Istanbul, which 
has a court order to be demolished, yet it still keeps functioning.  
 was constructed on a public parcel near the European shoreline of the Bosphorus, the 
residents facing Europe on the Asian side were forced to view a tall steel building that with 
its lack of concern for blending in with its geographical and historical location deteriorated 
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the coast line of Istanbul.  Similarly, the spreading of the informal settlements toward the 
forest lands and water sources is a vital threat for the lives of each inhabitant in Istanbul. 
Thus, since there will always be a relation between a human being and his/her physical 
environment via seeing and/or other senses, lives of the urbanites are indeed interconnected 
no matter where they live and how they live. Life, as the late 19th century sociologist Emile 
Durkheim put it, works as a “unity” of which the division into disconnected elements is 
impossible.6
Anthony King states that “…our daily lived experience of the city where we spent 
most of our time is, socially and spatially, exceedingly limited. We live for much of our lives, 
only in a fragment of the city.”
 As a consequence, if there is an urban problem such as with the informal 
settlements, it will be evident in every component of “the city” and will not be solely limited 
to its site and to its local inhabitants. 
7 Even though one live in a fragment of the city, it should be 
stressed that the city is not socially fragmented. The social confrontations that happen, 
actively or passively, between different individuals in the streets of a city, allows people to 
obtain insights into each other’s worlds. Asef Bayat sees these the “passive or active 
networks” established in public spaces as a part of what he calls as “street politics.”8
                                                 
6 Emile Durkheim, Emile Durkehim: Selected Writings, ed. Anthony Giddens, p.69, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
 Such 
social confrontations are more likely to happen in less developed/developing countries, 
where informal practices are more prevail, hence interactions with street vendors, cart 
pushers, trash or paper collectors, and the like happen outside one’s front door. 
7 Anthony D. King, "Boundaries, Networks, and Cities: Playing and Replaying Diasporas and 
Histories" in Urban Imaginaries: Locating the Modern City, ed. Alev Cinar and Thomas Bender, p.1, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007). 
8 Asef Bayat, "Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the ‘Informal People’," Third World Quarterly, vol. 
18, no. 1, (March 1997): p.63-64. 
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Consequently, the “fabric of human experience” in Istanbul “as a site of everyday practices” 
cautions one to take a wider view beyond the architecture itself in order to understand the 
macro-processes shaping life in a given city.9 It is argued here that the growth of the 
traditionalist “informal” sector as a type of occupation and accommodation in Istanbul is 
linked with uneven regional development within Turkey and transition from etatism10
 
 to 
capitalism in the 1950s. 
Migration Process 
The motivations vary according to the type of migration whether it is internal or 
external and there would certainly be exceptions in the personal scale, but if focusing on the 
reasons for massive internal migration in the developing world, it is a matter of uneven 
development between different regions of the country.  Yet even migration that is internal 
might have international or global implications. For example, the introduction of new health 
measures and spread of modern hygiene and medicine after the World War II significantly 
reduced mortality rates;11
                                                 
9 Anthropologist Setha Low states that “…city as a site of everyday practice provides valuable insights 
into the linkages of macro-processes with the texture and fabric of human experience.”  Setha M. Low, “The 
Anthropology of Cities: Imagining and Theorizing the City,” Annual Review of Anthropology, vol. 25, (1996); 
p. 384.  
 thus the widening of the gap between mortality and fertility rates 
10 Etatism was an economic model that was used in Turkey from 1931 to 1950s and which projected 
the existence of state-owned enterprises together with the private firms. More information will be given further 
in the text.  
11 Wolfgang Lutz and Ren Qiang, "Determinants of Human Population Growth," Philosophical 
Transactions: Biological Sciences, vol. 357, no. 1425, Population Growth Rate: Determining Factors and Role 
in Population Regulation, (September 29, 2002): p.1197. 
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caused remarkable growth in world’s total population.12 In the more developed countries 
(MDC), the population growth based on the mortality decline was a result of two-centuries of 
“…better housing, improved sanitation, and progress in preventive and curative medicine;”13 
but in the less developed countries (LDC), it was merely a quick response to the application 
of the “medical and public health technology to infectious, parasitic and diarrheal 
diseases.”14 Subsequently, when the demographic transitions were juxtaposed, it was seen 
that, at a comparable development stage, the LDCs had to deal with population growth that 
was three times more than that of the MDCs.15 In addition, the international migration map 
of the world also evolved after the Second World War, whereby “immigration became a truly 
global phenomenon as the number and variety of both sending and receiving countries 
increased”16 and the worldwide supply of immigrants experienced a shift from Europe to the 
Third World contradictory to the conditions before the Great Depression of 1929.17
Indeed, while there were world-wide changes in the population and migration trends, 
the post-war period’s global effects were also to be seen in Turkey. In order to clarify the 
high rates of migration within Turkey, four questions shall be asked: “where” these 
immigrants were coming from, “who” these immigrants were, “how” they came to the big 
cities, and finally “why” were they migrating. Primarily, most of the immigrants came from 
rural areas or less industrialized cities that had economies largely depended upon on 
  
                                                 
12 John L. Taylor and David G. Williams, "Problems and Issues in Asian Urban Areas-and the 
Response of Planning Practice" in Urban Planning Practice in Developing Countries, ed. John Taylor and 
David G. Williams, p.5, (USA: Pergamon Press, 1982). 
13 Lutz and Qiang, p. 1199. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  p. 1197.  
16 Douglas S. Massey, "The Social and Economic Origins of Immigration," Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 510, World Population: Approaching the Year 2000, (July, 1990): 
p.62. 
17 Massey, p. 62. 
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agriculture as a source of income. The so-called rural to urban migration type is not limited 
to Turkey; it can be found in Egypt, in Iran or even in New Mexico in the United States18 as 
well. For example, in relation to the immigration from the countryside, Istanbul’s population 
increased from 860,00019 in the beginning of the 20th century to 1.1 million20 by the mid 20th 
century and to 10 million21 by 2000 and then to 12.5 million by 2007.22 Similarly, due to the 
huge waves of rural immigrants between 1800 and 2000, Cairo’s population rose from some 
200,000 to more than 12 million and Tehran’s population even more remarkably rose from 
10,000 to more than 8 million.23 Casablanca suffered from rural to urban migration as well; 
its population increased from 20,000 people to 3 million between 1900 and 2000.24
                                                 
18 Smith’s work was related to cultural geography of former rural Hispanics in their new urban 
neighborhoods in Albuquerque, Espanola, and Santa Fe in New Mexico and Pueblo in Colorado. Jeffrey Smith, 
"Rural Place Attachment in Hispano Urban Centers," Geographical Review, vol. 92, no. 3 (July, 2002) : p.432-
451. 
 The 
profile of the immigrants of rural to urban migration is generally an unskilled worker, likely 
lacking a secondary or tertiary school education. The general rural to urban migration pattern 
is as follows; a single man goes to the city and generally when it is understood that there is 
no chance of making a living in the countryside, the rest of his family follows him. In 
problematizing rural to urban migration, the developing world context is more complicated 
19 Stanford J. Shaw, "The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 10, no. 2 (May, 1979): p.266. 
20 Composite of UN-HABITAT Urban Indicators Database (2002); Thomas Brinkhoff “The Principal 
Agglomerations of the World,” www.citypopulation.de/World.html (May 2004). Cited in: Davis, “Planet of 
Slums,” p. 4. 
21  Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu [in English: Statistical Institute of Turkey] “İstatiksel Tablolar: İllere 
Göre Nüfusun Nitelikleri, 2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı” [in English: The Statistical Tables: Quality of the 
Population in Accordance with the Cities, Population Census of 2000], http://www.tuik.gov.tr/ (accessed April 
01, 2009). 
22 “Turkey: Istanbul City Districts,” http://www.citypopulation.de/Turkey-Istanbul.html (accessed 
April 01, 2009). 
23 Mark Allen Peterson, "The Middle East and The Islamic World" in International Studies: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to Global Issues, Sheldon Anderson et al. p. 279 (Colorado: Westview Press, 2008). 
24 Peterson, p. 279.  
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because, first, it is in a greater scale than in the developed world, and second, the harshness 
awaiting the newcomers in the city is related to where the country stands in the world 
economy.  
The macro-processes create a set of conditions with which the individuals have to 
contend. The linked conditions prepare and motivate people for immigrating and “push” 
people out of their rural hometowns to immigrate to the bigger cities where there are 
perceived to be numerous opportunities. Some of these push factors are high population 
growth-rate in the countryside, unavailability of arable land for all peasants, transition to a 
more mechanical agriculture and lack of the privileges associated with living in a city such as 
more social freedom, variety of economic activities, better health-care, and education. It is 
clear that migration has strong ties with the financial dissatisfaction, but in the rural to urban 
immigration model of the developing/underdeveloped world, it is more than a wage 
calculation.25
                                                 
25  Macroeconomic theory states that “the balance of labor supply and demand within regional 
markets” causes migration until equilibrium between two regions is achieved. With this theory, breadwinners 
keep moving from the low-wage area to the higher one (if the high wages compensate the costs of movement 
and adaptation process) until the demand is excessively met. However, the increase in the workers available in 
the high-wage area will cause a slight decrease in the high wages in contrast to the increase in the wages in the 
low-wage area due to loss of workers.  Michael J. Greenwood, Migration and Economic Growth in the United 
States, (New York, Academic Press, 1981). Quoted in: Massey, "The Social and Economic Origins of 
Immigration," p.64. 
 The decision maker’s economic condition is likely to be the outcome of a 
macro-process in which he is not given many options to act upon. For example, the growth-
rate based on the births is an indicator that if the necessary investments in education, health-
care, and transportation are not made and the new job opportunities are not created, 
eventually within a few decades, a group of people in that region will be forced to make a 
decision between moving or staying. If for some reason the authorities have not taken an 
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action upon population growth, the individual is left by himself in his prospective life-
struggle.  
The macro-processes also create a set of opportunities for the individuals which can 
“pull” people to the cities and allow them to settle down. For example, the agglomeration of 
investments made in specific regions in terms of industry, commerce and public services -
health, education, transportation, or security- will be attracting new migrants.  Besides the 
obvious pull factors, there can also be some unplanned and rather coincidental opportunities 
for the newcomers as well such as the “hand-me-down” housing. For example, when most of 
the non-Muslim minorities have left their homes due to various government policies and 
external conditions26 in some neighborhoods like Dolapdere, Fener, or Balat in Istanbul, the 
newcomers with limited financial sources can occupy the abandoned houses in these 
neighborhoods. Some post-colonial states also have similar examples, where the mansions 
and villas of ruling class were later used to house the desperate urban poor like the 
“palomares of Guatemala City,” “avenidas of Rio,” “conventillos of Buenos Aires and 
Santiago,” “quintas of Quito,” and “cuarterias of Old Havana.” Algier’s famous seaside 
district as a former colonial neighborhood, “Bab-el-Oued,” was also later on inhabited by the 
urban poor.27 Cairo’s “City of the Dead” is another significant example where the old 
Mameluke tombs are used as housing units by a population of one million.28
                                                 
26 The most significant government policy was the mutual population exchange policy that projected 
Greeks that reside in Turkey and Turks residing in Greece to be exchanged in the 1920s. Additionally, when 
new nation-states were established such as Greece and Bulgaria in the 19th century and Israel in the 20th century, 
the minorities have been attracted to out-migration toward their own nation-states. After the devastation of the 
Ottoman Empire, abolishment of capitulations, and founding of modern Turkey, various European nationals 
tended to leave Istanbul during the 20th century.  
  
27 Mike Davis, "The Urban Climacteric" in Planet of Slums, p.32, (New York: Verso, 2006). 
28 Davis, p. 33. 
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 Figure 2- Fener district and its “hand-me-down” type of houses, in Istanbul. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan. 
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Indeed, migration movements that were triggered with push and pull factors should 
not only be perceived as trends limited to population studies. Since generally urban birth 
rates are lower than that of rural29, migration process should be regarded as the main motive 
shaping the spatial and social tension in Istanbul, to which shortage of housing, increase real 
estate values, inefficiency of urban services, and marginalization of informal activities can be 
attributed. Additionally, internal migration to Istanbul should be evaluated together with the 
political and economic dynamics’ impacts on regional development and redistribution of 
population between agricultural and industrial sectors. For example, in 1935 and after the 
war in 1945, Istanbul’s population was around 4.6 percent of Turkey’s total population for 
the respective years. However, Istanbul started to absorb more of Turkey’s total population 
starting with the 1950s. Istanbul’s share in Turkey’s total population was 5.27 percent in 
1955; 5.29 percent in 1960; 5.55 percent in 1965; and a significant 14.75 percent in 2000.30 
Therefore, a further examination on the political and economical developments in Turkey for 
the period of Post-World War II Era31
 In addition to Istanbul serving as the major destination of rural immigrants in 
Turkey, the city has long been a center of attraction for different activity groups in the state 
 should be conducted in order to comprehend the 
catalysts that initiated the asymmetrical population growth of Istanbul in the 1950s.  Yet, 
before analyzing the socio-political and economic developments for the given period, 
Istanbul’s regional potentials, historical and geographical advantages should be mentioned.   
                                                 
29 John M. Munro, “Migration in Turkey,” Economic Development of Cultural Change, vol. 22, no. 4 
(July, 1974): p. 634. 
30 These rates were calculated based on figures noted in several sources: Brice, W. C. “The Population 
of Turkey in 1950,” The Geographical Journal, Vol.120, No. 3, (September, 1954): p. 347; Munro, p. 648;  
UN-data, “Population by Sex and Urban/ Rural Residence,” 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode:1 (accessed July 01, 2009). 
31 The post-war era will be restricted from 1945 to 1960.  
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economy. However, even as the capital of the Ottoman Empire back in the 19th century, it did 
not necessarily absorb the largest population; for example, in 1885 provinces of Aydın, 
Bursa, Trabzon, Kastamonu, and Konya were more populous than Istanbul.32
Yet the population and industrial growth of Istanbul was not unpredicted even though 
earlier in the 1930s the Kemalist policies
  
33 favored an even development through all 
regions.34 First, there were already some workshops and factories in Istanbul together with 
some other cities in the Marmara and Aegean Regions (which are the coastal areas in the 
north-west and west of Turkey) when the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. These 
factories were built mainly for supplying the demands of the Ottoman palace and due to the 
necessities that emerged after the westernization of the Ottoman army in the early 19th 
century,35 but also supplied some demands of the local inhabitants of Istanbul.36
                                                 
32 Population of Istanbul in 1885 was 873,565 whereas the population of Aydın, Bursa, Trabzon, 
Kastamonu, and Konya were 1,408,387; 1,336,492; 1,056,293; 949,116; and 944,009 respectively. Stanford J. 
Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population, 1831-1914," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
vol. 9, no. 3, (October, 1978): p.338. 
 Some of 
these Istanbul factories served to produce military uniforms, porcelain and glass in Beykoz, 
33 Kemalist policies refer to the six arrows of development described by Turkey’s founder Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk; republicanism, populism, nationalism, etatism, reformism, and secularism. From these six 
arrows, two of them can be thought to be more related to spatial development of regions. Etatism is directly 
related to economic development, whereas populism projects equal social development without any social class. 
Etatism policy will be explained more in detail further in the text.  
34 Robinson stated that much of Turkish state-owned industries were situated in poor locations, 
meaning places often far away from either markets or skilled labor sources, with the intention of providing 
“alternative employment to those who would one day be displaced from the land.” Richard D. Robinson, 
“Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.22, No. 
3, Special Issue on Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas, (Autumn, 1958): p.403. 
35 T.Gül Köksal, Zeynep Ahunbay, “İstanbul’daki Endüstri Mirası için Koruma ve Yeniden Kullanım 
Önerileri [Suggestions of Conservation and Reusing for the Industrial Heritage in Istanbul],” İTÜ Dergisi/A: 
Mimarlık, Planlama, Tasarım [Journal of ITU: Architecture, Planing, Design], vol.5, no.2, sec.2, (September, 
2006): p.126. 
36 Köksal and Ahunbay, p.131 
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and textiles in Zeytinburnu.37 However, the majority of the Istanbul factories of the 19th 
century operated for a period of time and then cancelled production;38 from the 256 factories 
in the beginning of the 20th century, there were only 43 left by 2005.39 One reason was the 
economic hardships and ethnic change of the social composition during the First World War 
(1914-1918). Due to mutual transferring of Greeks from Anatolia and Turks from Greece,40 
the production and trade conditions varied before and after the war in Turkey. For example, 
in another major town, Bursa, there were 41 workshops that produced silk and a silk thread 
factory in 1914; however, the number of these workshops in Bursa decreased to 12 in 1926,41 
while the displaced Anatolian Greeks increased the silk production in Greece.42 Other 
reasons for closing down the Istanbul factories of the 19th century in the 20th century were 
associated with the loss of function, being technologically out-of-date or polluting the city 
and so on.43
Second, historically, Istanbul was a major port that had a railway connection to 
Europe and Asia. Apart from some towns in the west and in the south-eastern national border 
of Turkey, most of the Anatolian cities were inaccessible due to lack of rail connection.  
  
                                                 
37 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [in English: Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “İmalat Sanayii: 
Cumhuriyet Öncesi Sanayi Politikaları ve İmalat Sanayinin Genel Yapısı [in English: Production Industry: Pre-
Republican Industry Policies and the General Structure of the Production Industry].”  
38 Gül Köksal’s study demonstrated the industrial heritage of Istanbul with the locations of the factories 
from the 19th and early 20th century together with their periods of functioning. From her listing, I have noted up 
to 31 factories producing/processing food, textile, leather, chemicals, earthenware, and timber and 8 factories 
processing metal that belonged to the pre-Republican era. For further research: Köksal and Ahunbay, p. 125-
136.  
39 Köksal and Ahunbay, p.132 
40 The mutual population exchange policy was agreed in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 after the defeat 
of the Greek forces in the Greco-Turkish War of 1922 following the World War I.  
41 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Imalat Sanayi [Production 
Industry]:Cumhuriyetin Ilk Yillarinda Uygulanan Ekonomi Politikaları [in English: The Economic Policies in 
the First Years of the Republic].”  
42 Ibid.  
43 A. Föhl, Bauten der Industrie und Technik, Schriftenreihe des Deutschen  Nationalkomitees fur 
Denkmalschutz, (Bonn: 1995): p.47. Quoted in: Köksal and Ahunbay, p.132 
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Third, Istanbul was economically and strategically privileged in being located nearby a very 
important water body that connects the Black Sea countries with rest of the world, the 
Marmara Sea. The effect of Istanbul’s geographical condition on its over-population was not 
coincidental of course, as the most populous cities were observed to be by or around a main 
water body. Fourteen out of the largest 19 cities in the world are port cities that are either 
located along a coastline or in a river delta.44 Examples of large port cities include Tokyo 
with a population of 35.6 million, New York-Newark with a population of 19 million, 
Mumbai with a population of 18.9 million, Shanghai with a population of 14.9 million, 
Kolkata with a population of 14.7 million.45 Furthermore, Istanbul benefitted from “handling 
about half of the shipping”46 in the Ottoman ports and having a natural harbor (the Golden 
Horn) which is regarded as one of the world’s best harbors47 while the rest of “the coast line 
of modern Turkey on the Black, Aegean, and Mediterranean Seas suffers from a scarcity of 
natural harbors.”48
Therefore, due to local push and pull factors, and global trends like the population 
boom, Istanbul easily became a center of attraction for the rural to urban immigrants. Owing 
much to the country-scale and city-scale dynamics, Istanbul’s population almost doubled and 
increased dramatically from around 861,000 in 1945 to 1,467,000 in 1960.
 
49
                                                 
44 United Nations Human Settlements Programme: UN-HABITAT, “State of the World Cities 
2008/2009: Harmonic Cities” p.5, (London: Earthscan: 2008). 
 As mentioned 
earlier, in accordance with the magnitude of the internal migration that took place in the post-
45 Ibid. p.6 
46 Philip Ernest Schoenberg, "The Evolution of Transport in Turkey (Eastern Thrace and Asia Minor) 
under Ottoman Rule," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, (October, 1977): p.361. 
47 Schoenberg, p. 359. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Munro, p. 648. 
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war period, the spatial and social stress in Istanbul was very severe, and appearance of the 
gecekondu settlements was inevitable.  
 
Figure 3- A digital camera picture of Istanbul as of April 16, 2004. Istanbul’s urban agglomeration, forest areas, the 
Boshporus Strait, the Black Sea, and the Marmara Sea can be noticed from this image. Source: “Istanbul, Turkey: The 
Crossroads of Europe and Asia,” NASA Earth Observatory, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=4466 
(accessed April 16, 2009).  
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The Transition to The Gecekondu 
Historically at first, the gecekondu type of housing in Turkey was an urban problem 
for Ankara, the capital of the newly founded Turkish Republic (Table 1). Right after Ankara 
being declared the capital in 1923, Ankara’s population grew by 6 percent in the same year.50 
Even though there were some squatters here and there in the three major cities of Turkey 
(Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir), they were rarely perceived as a major urban problem until the 
end of the Second World War in 1945.51 The existence of gecekondu houses could have been 
related to extreme economic conditions in a war economy, yet these neighborhoods did not 
fade away in the post-war period. Şenyapılı noted that it was the 1950s that the governments 
in Turkey started to regard gecekondu type of housing as a political investment.52 A year 
before the elections of 1954, the Adnan Menderes government passed a statute on 
“Encouragement of Building Construction” and “Unauthorized Buildings” (No. 6188) which 
enabled municipalities to purchase state land and make modifications on their own land for 
construction of cheap and affordable housing to accommodate the gecekondu dwellers who 
lived in that city for two years or more.53
                                                 
50 İlhan Tekeli and Tarık Okyay, "Case Study of a Relocated Capital: Ankara" in Urban Planning 
Practice in Developing Countries, ed. John L. Taylor and David G. Williams, p.129, (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1982). 
 As the “pre-election investments” of the Democrat 
Party (DP) worked out, with the elections of 1954, Menderes formed the government again. 
Furthermore, when the initial model for “enacting a law to pardon and legitimize” the 
gecekondu and its dwellers was also repeated in 1959 which served to approve the existing 
51 Tekeli and Okyay, p. 132. 
52 Tansi Şenyapılı, “Baraka”dan Gecekonduya: Ankara’da Kentsel Mekanın Dönüşümü 1923-1960 [in 
English: From “Shack” to Overnight House: The Transformation of Urban Space in Ankara 1923-1960], p.202, 
(Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004). 
53 Şenyapılı, p. 202-203.  
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gecekondu structures but prohibited the future constructions,54 the gecekondu existence in the 
cities was consolidated during the 1950s.   Additionally, the critical period for the expansion 
of these informal settlements was the 1950s (as mentioned earlier) due to its acceleration in 
growth. As of 1955, the population living in gecekondu dwellings was estimated to be 
250,000 people, which meant 4.7 percent of the urban population in Turkey. By 1960, the 
population living in gecekondu dwellings in Turkey increased up to 1.2 million, making 16.4 
percent of the urban population gecekondu dwellers.55
Table 1- Percentage of Population Increase in Turkish Cities with Populations more 
than 100,000 from 1935 to 1965 
 
 
 
 
Source: Turkey, Prime Ministry, State Institute of Statistics, October 24, 1965 Census of Population: Social and Economic 
Characteristics of the Population (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1969), Table 4, p.27. Referred to in:  Munro, J., 
Migration in Turkey 1974, p.648.  Listing was made from highest to the lowest city population for the cities that had more 
than 100,000 inhabitants in 1965.  
 
The development of the gecekondu  as an informal and unplanned way to deal with 
the accommodation problem in the Turkish cities shows similarities with the general 
definition of “slum,” which is used to describe an insecure, overcrowded, poor, and informal 
                                                 
54 Oktay Ekinci,  Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları [in English: Cases of Istanbul from Past to 
Present], p.21-30,  (Istanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1995). 
55 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Yerleşme Düzeni ve Kentleşme [in 
English: Planning and Urbanization]: 1980’lerde Konut Sorunun Genel Görünümü [in English: The General 
View of the Housing Problem in 1980s].”  
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type of housing without adequate access to water and sanitation56 or the recent definition in 
which the household lacks one or more of the following five conditions: “durable housing, 
sufficient living area, access to improved water, access to sanitation, and/or secure tenure” in 
an urban area. 57
Nevertheless, it is still problematic to locate a direct translation in English or any 
other language for the expression gecekondu, a concept that has been nurtured under local 
political, economical, social and geographical forces. Gecekondu, if described as “squatter 
houses/communities or shantytowns,” would be making references leading to inappropriate 
imageries in English and other languages.
 
58 This is so mainly because gecekondu as a 
housing type was shaped in the Turkish society. With regard to Durkheim’s statement that 
“…it is the land which bears the imprint of society,”59
                                                 
56UN-HABITAT, The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003, London 2003, 
p.3. Quoted in: Davis, p.22-23. 
 it could further be claimed that the 
gecekondu landscape is an imprint of Turkish society on the land it occupies just as kampung 
is of Malaysian society and favela is of Brazilian society. For that reason, giving them a 
single name might be risky and abstractive. In a similar way, Ayse Öncü asserts that “the so-
called informal neighborhoods of Istanbul are by no means the shanty towns of Africa or the 
favelas of Latin America” due to the opportunities they create for “capitalizing on increasing 
land values,” which enabled some “waves of immigrants” to acquire the legal rights of the 
property they have occupied. After they had legal proof of ownership of their property, the 
very valuable urban land they had previously taken over made them “owners of rentals, 
57 United Nations Human Settlements Program:UN-HABITAT “State of the World’s Cities 2006/7,” 
p.21 (London: Earthscan, 2006). 
58 Kyle T. Evered, "Symbolizing a Modern Anatolia: Ankara as Capital in Turkey’s Early Republican 
Landscape," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 28, no. 2, (2008) : p.338. 
59 Durkheim, p. 88. 
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multi-storey buildings and so on.”60
Similar to what major cities in the other developing countries in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, Istanbul experienced a remarkable economic, social and spatial transition 
right after the Second World War to a city nicknamed by its inhabitants and the media as the 
“mega-village” of Turkey in the span of five to six decades time. The emergence of 
associating Istanbul as a mega-village can be attributed to local authorities’ inability to deal 
with the increasing informal urban residential settlements, rather than the fact that most of 
the immigrants were coming from the countryside or less developed towns. Moreover, it can 
be seen that the appreciative attitude of the DP government and the laws enacted in 1953 and 
1959 to “prevent” the expansion of the gecekondu settlements proved to be inefficient in 
dealing with the gecekondu problem in the Turkish cities, since almost a four-fold increase in 
the population of the gecekondu dwellers from 1955 to 1960 indicated.  In addition, starting 
with the DP’s policies, the laws that pardon and legitimize the gecekondu dwellings shifted 
comprehension of the gecekondu from a basic need for shelter for urban poor to a source of 
income with the rents earned by the owners via construction of additional rooms or floors to 
the existing gecekondu houses.  
 Consequently, even though any English translation 
might not be the exact definition of what comprises a gecekondu or favela is, the thesis will 
regard these housing types as sub-categories under the term urban “slum” in order to make 
comparisons. 
  
                                                 
60 Ayşe Öncü, "The Myth of the Ideal Home Travels across Cultural Borders to Istanbul" in Space, 
Culture and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities, ed. Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland, p. 68,72,  (New 
Jersey: Zed Books, 1997). 
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Turkish National Industrialization versus Foreign Aid/Investment  
In Turkey, problems regarding the lack of consistency with developing and 
consolidating national industrialization movement collided with receiving foreign 
aids/investments and borrowing loans from outside sources.  Though, foreign investment in 
the developing world is thought to be nothing, but exploiting the resources and workforce of 
a country under the name of a “free-market economy” in the post-colonial age. Sullivan notes 
that some studies61 find that “many industrialized nations have gained their advantage by 
exploitation and at the expense of the underdeveloped world.” He mentions some other 
studies as well62 that explain the role of “military, technological, and financial dependence” 
on industrialized nations’ strong influence and even control over the policy-making and 
economic development process of the less-developed or the developing nations.63
                                                 
61 R. I. Rhodes, “The Disguised Conservatism in Evolutionary Development Theory,” Science and 
Socitey 32, (1968): p.4; A. G. Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review, 18, 4, (1969): 
17-31; W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1973). 
Quoted in: Gerard Sullivan, "Uneven Development and National Income Inequality in Third World Countries: 
A National Study of the Effects of External Economic Dependency," Sociological Perspectives, vol. 26, no. 2 
(April, 1983): p.203. 
  In 
addition, Hey explains that the dependency theorists’ work disagree with the national 
specialization in production of certain commodities that liberal economic theory assumed 
would bring comparative advantage to both trading sides; disagreement was based on the 
62 J. Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” Journal of Peace Research 8, (1971): 81-117; T. 
Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, (Australia: Penguin, 1971);  C. Payer, The Debt Trap? The IMF and the Third 
World, (Australia: Penguin, 1974). Quoted in: Sullivan, p. 203. 
63 Sullivan, p. 203.  
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unfair trade pattern that functioned as a continuation of the former colonial trade model .64 
Owing to the need for capital to implement infrastructure projects and Soviet pressure65
Gerard Sullivan maintains that the expansion of the modern sector was thought to be 
a result of foreign investment in less developed countries; yet, he adds that various studies 
also “recognized” the linkage between “the corresponding stagnation and involution in other 
sectors,
 in 
the 1950s, Turkey aligned toward the U.S. and Western Europe. Thus, the state-owned 
enterprises gradually lost their reputation to initiate socio-economic development in Turkey 
among government projects, while more liberal investments that will encourage private 
sector and foreign investment gained importance. 
66 marginalization of displaced labor, and growth of the informal service sector67 
within the same process.68
In addition, the emergence of informal urban economy was previously addressed in 
this text and linked with migration to Istanbul or other major cities. The main reason of 
 As mentioned earlier, in Istanbul, there exists a notion of 
overlapping dual lives in the city sphere. The duality in the city, which can be either defined 
as “formal and informal” or “modern and traditionalist” approaches of making a living and 
supplying the accommodation demand, thus, can be regarded as an outcome of the foreign 
investments in the less developed world. 
                                                 
64 Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Latin American Development and U.S.-Latin American Relations" in 
International Studies: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Global Issues, Sheldon Anderson et al. p. 234, 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 2008). 
65 More detail will be given further in the text.  
66 C. Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia, (Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press, 1963). Quoted in: Sullivan, p. 205. 
67  J. Weeks, “Uneven Sectoral Development and the Role of the State,” Institute of Development 
Studies Bull. 5 (October): 76-82; H. Koo, “Centre-periphery Relations and Marginalization: Empirical Analysis 
of the Dependency Model of Inequality in Peripheral Nations,” Development and Change, 12: 55-76. Quoted in: 
Sullivan, p. 205. 
68 Sullivan, p. 205. 
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migration, the inequality of opportunities that exist between Istanbul and most of the cities in 
Anatolia69 can be attributed to the inefficient development of non-agrarian economic sectors 
throughout Anatolia such as, industry and commerce. Melvin Albaum and Christopher 
Davies notes that in Turkey, the distinctive regional disparities and “a socio-economic 
system with many dualisms in its structure” is a result of the uneven distribution of economic 
growth and capital expenditures for development which have steadily increased.70 In 
addition, it is also useful to refer back to the notion of gecekondu as a sub-category of 
“slum,” and compare the impact of industrial and economic development on slum rates in the 
world. While residents of slums make up only the 6 percent of the urban population in the 
developed countries, it had been estimated that this rate rises up to 78.2 percent in the least-
developed world.71 The rate of slum dwellers in the United States is 5.8 percent whereas in 
South Korea it is 37.0 percent, in Argentina 33.1 percent, in Turkey 42.6 percent; in India 
55.5 percent and in some African countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania more than 90.0 
percent.72  Moreover, in a comparison made according to UN data, it has been found that 
“…the per-capita income differential between a rich city like Seattle and a very poor city like 
Ibadan” had an enormous gap of 739 to 1.73
                                                 
69 Asia Minor. 
  As a consequence, it is argued here that there is 
a correlation of more developed countries having low levels of urban slum rates and less 
developed countries having higher urban slum rates. 
70 Melvin Albaum and Christopher S. Davies, “The Spatial Structure of Socio-Economic Attributes of 
Turkish Provinces,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, (July, 1973): p.288. 
71 Davis, p. 23. 
72 Davis, p. 24. 
73 Davis, pp. 25-26. 
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The huge gap of slum rates between the developed (industrialized) countries and the 
developing/underdeveloped can be perceived in relation to the increasing number of 
displaced laborers (the peasants) in a society, in which the distribution of workforce from 
agriculture to industry is taking place. Francois Nielsen refers to Kuznets’ work74 in which 
the early stage of industrialization was thought to consist of a very productive but small 
modern sector with high wages, and a large traditional agricultural sector with relatively low 
productivity and low wages; with growth of industry, a large number of the work force was 
to detach from the “low-income traditional sector” to the “high-income modern one.”75 
Kuznets’ theory puts forth to explain that the population shifts from one sector to another so 
as to produce “as an automatic numerical consequence, a trajectory of income inequality that 
increases, levels off, and then decreases, with a peak at some intermediate stage of 
development.”76
                                                 
74 Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” American Economic Review, 45, 
(1955): 1-28.  Quoted in: Francois Nielsen, "Income Inequality and Industrial Development: Dualism 
Revisited," American Sociological Review, vol. 59, no. 5 (October, 1994): p.655. 
  Thus, while the social shift is taking place as the distribution of the work 
force evolves, the income gap between the formal workforce (involved with industrial or 
agrarian production) and the informal workforce (the displaced workers involved with 
secondary urban jobs) broadens. Coming back to the Turkish case, after the expansion of 
industrial sector under the etatist economic policies, the emergence of a new bourgeoisie 
class in modern Turkey was predictable. However, the evolution of the new capitalist social 
class in Turkey has also ties with the high rates of inflation during the war period, which as 
Edwards claims caused the masses to suffer while “the industrialists, the farmers, the 
75 Nielsen, p. 658.  
76 Nielsen, p. 658. 
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speculators in every commodity waxed fat.”77
The inequality as Nielsen perceives from similar studies is linked with a certain stage 
in the development process rather than “steady-state outcome of social change.”
 Therefore by 1945, there was already a socio-
economic polarization in Turkey due to the income inequalities and a small group with 
greater sources (and power) that managed to emerge from an economy which was previously 
heavily dependent upon agriculture.  
78 Nielsen 
also states that the issue of income inequalities in a specific country had been heavily 
analyzed together with the political democracy and functioning of the political rights, which 
as a result emerged the idea that “political democracy as a long-term consequence of 
industrialization” was to reduce inequality.79 John Taylor and David Williams in regard to 
the “weak integration of national economies and the excessive differences in income, wealth, 
and opportunity,” claims them to be connected essentially with politics as they suggest that 
“…the political power is largely concentrated in the hands of the same wealthy elites who 
control the economy and who live chiefly in the larger urban centers, particularly in the 
primate cities.”80 They add that decision-making becomes highly centralized which results in 
the replacement of democratically elected governments with “dictatorships ruled by one 
person or a small clique,” hence causing a “dangerous polarization” among the ruling elite’s 
and “those of the rural and urban peasantry’s interests.” 81
                                                 
77 A. C. Edwards, “The Impact of the War on Turkey,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), vol. 22, no.3, (July, 1946): p.389. 
 In reference to Gramsci’s 
78 Nielsen, p. 655.  
79 Nielsen, p. 656-657.  
80John L. Taylor, David G. Williams. "Problems and Issues in Asian Urban Areas - and the Response 
of Planning Practice" in Urban Planning Practice in Developing Countries, ed. John Taylor and David G. 
Williams, p. 10, (USA: Pergamon Press, 1982). 
81 Taylor and Williams, p. 10. 
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introduction of hegemony of one class,  Henri Lefebvre asserts that the dictatorship of either 
the bourgeoisie or the proletariat is to be exercised over a society together with the inclusion 
of “culture and knowledge” far beyond the level of influence and even suppressive 
violence.82 The reason why Lefebvre uses the term violence could be linked to the idea that, 
by and large, the various different social sentiments and conditions escape the sphere of 
authority of the state, as the state was defined to be a group of officials formulating 
regulations involving the majority even though those regulations were not necessarily 
produced collectively.83
Taylor and Williams argue that it was the government policies that cause a conflict 
between the two sectors of urban economy; one that is capital-intensive, the other that is 
labor-intensive. They further add that the governments direct most of their attention and 
support to the capital intensive modern sector while neglecting the labor-intensive informal 
sector which is the “chief source of employment.”
  
84 Sullivan has similar views with Taylor 
and Williams in that he concludes that “the other sectors of the economy, including most of 
the service sector and traditional agriculture,” which do not receive foreign capital have 
suffered for lack of investment and thus “…have not increased their productivity levels, and 
have become stagnant” even though they “absorbed” much of the work force.85
In light of this discussion, it can be argued that when Turkey became more open to 
the free-market economy instead of wedded to the semi-capitalist, semi-socialist former 
development policy of “etatism”, the emergence of high rural migration to urban centers and 
  
                                                 
82 Henri Lefebvre, "Plan of the Present Work" in The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-
Smith, p. 10, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). 
83 Durkheim, p. 192. 
84 Taylor and Williams, p. 6-7. 
85 Sullivan, p. 206-207.  
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the development of a “marginalized” informal sector was inevitable, as well as the 
consolidation of the new bourgeoisie class whose benefits were championed over the masses’ 
needs.   
Re/Production of Urbanscape 
For Lefebvre, the space in different levels and scales are bailiwicks of different social 
practices; human habitat is linked to architecture; urban space, containing towns and cities, is 
the major concern of urbanism; and larger territories either “regional, national, continental or 
worldwide” set the interest of planning and economy.86 Nevertheless, when spheres of 
architecture, urbanism, planning, and economy are not fragmented into different realms, only 
one practice is thought to embrace all in the most privileged way, politics.87 Politics in this 
context is related to the decision-making process of a manipulative power of group related to 
creation/production of space. However, David Harvey warns of the acute dangers of 
understanding urban process as an active aspect of political-economic development due to his 
view of urbanization as a “spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of 
different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact through a particular 
configuration of interlocking spatial practices.”88
                                                 
86 Lefebvre, p. 12. 
 To link these ideas, it may be said that 
politics, or rather power, has the utmost influence on social practices (including, but not 
limited to architecture, urbanism, planning and economy), and urbanization as a spatial 
process is very much related to social processes that develop spatially. Indeed, the way 
87 Ibid. 
88David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban 
Governance in Late Capitalism," Geografiska Annaler.Series B, Human Geography, vol. 71, no. 1, The Roots 
of Geographical Change: 1973 to the Present (1989): p.5. 
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politics and power is exercised on space is generally realized in a passive way, in the form of 
something else, such as migration.  
Migration in Turkey largely happened to be equated with “urbanization.”89
The unregulated heterogeneous characteristics of the neighboring districts in the city 
inflicted a total trauma in the delivery of urban services; thus, while the city spread, it lacked 
the ability to function properly. For example; in Sabah -one of the mainstream newspapers in 
Turkey- the news about the flood and death of a person in the Esenler district of Istanbul due 
 The urban 
landscape changed drastically and evolved through the following three phases: at first, new 
neighborhoods began to be formed in the proximity of historical urban core(s), government 
buildings, highways and/or industrial plants when the immigrant population was much more 
than expected. These people who hoped to find opportunity to work started to build up their 
own gecekondu dwellings on the outskirts of the city even though they did not necessarily 
find a job right away.  In the second phase, these initial neighborhoods were no longer on the 
periphery of the city; they became surrounded by the newly implemented commercial, 
industrial, and residential neighborhoods. In the last stage, the first pattern was repeated; the 
excessive number of immigrants settled down around the regions close to the new work 
places, but on the other hand, with the price increase in real estate in the urban center, the 
initial gecekondu settlements either grew in height or were demolished to open space for the 
new developments.   
                                                 
89 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Yerleşme Düzeni ve Kentleşme [in 
English: Planning and Urbanization]: Göç [in English: Migration].” 
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to heavy rain was noted in 2007.90 The details of the news relate that the person died in the 
textile workshop where he was working while waiting to be rescued by the officials. His 
workmates who were saved also could not get official help but the help of the citizens.91  The 
same tragic rain fall story was also in the another mainstream newspaper, Milliyet, with the 
title “Flood Nightmare in Istanbul”; the numerous traffic accidents with more than 30 injuries 
and heavy congestion on the bridges connecting Asia and Europe were reported together with 
the floods in Gaziosmanpaşa, Esenler, Alibeyköy, and Bağcılar districts of Istanbul;92 all of 
these neighborhoods happened to be those in the early gecekondu districts that are no longer 
in the periphery of the city. This kind of disaster news is not very surprising due to the 
character of the gecekondu type of settlement, which occupies lands that would be legally 
impossible to initiate a construction due to “…the restrictions in the Reconstruction, Public 
Health or Forest Laws.”93
                                                 
90 Sabah, “Istanbul’da sel alarmı: 1 ölü [in English: The Flood Alarm in Istanbul: One Death],” 
October 14, 2007, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/10/14/haber,E4F4BCE42E454AEC8673EC4F775C77F7.html 
(accessed March 28, 2009). 
 Thus, the large scale effect of gecekondu neighborhoods was this 
type of semi-planned cities which was inefficient to deliver public services and to provide its 
residents the facilities of a healthy and livable environment. Public response to inefficient 
delivery of urban services was to call Istanbul not a metropolis/megacity, but a “mega-
village.” For example, before the local elections of March 28, 2004 one of the leading 
newspapers in Turkey, Hürriyet, noticed the worries of businessmen in Istanbul for the 
91 Sabah, “Istanbul’da sel alarmı: 1 ölü [in English: The Flood Alarm in Istanbul: One Death],” 
October 14, 2007, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/10/14/haber,E4F4BCE42E454AEC8673EC4F775C77F7.html 
(accessed March 28, 2009). 
92 Haluk Atalay, “Istanbul’da sel kabusu,” Milliyet, October 14, 2007, 
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/10/14/yasam/axyas01.html accessed March 28, 2009). 
93 Ayşe Yönder, "Implications of Double Standards in Housing Policy: Development of Informal 
Settlements in Istanbul, Turkey" in Illegal Cities: Law and Urban Change in Developing Countries, ed. Edesio 
Fernandes and Ann Varley, p. 59, (New York: Zed Books, 1998). 
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selection of mayor candidates by the political parties. The main complain was on how “white 
disasters” in Istanbul block the daily life, and how important it is to choose candidates that 
will transform Istanbul from a “mega village” whose commerce, industry and customhouses 
stop functioning with snow or rainfall into a modern94 world city that could compete with 
cities like Paris, New York or London.95
This urban typology, which Turkish folk term kır-kent or as mega-köy meaning rural-
city or mega-village is definitely not seen merely in Turkey. This “neither rural nor urban” 
way of urban setting and the “collision between the rural and the urban” is also seen in 
China, much of Southeast Asia, India, Egypt, and into some extent West Africa.
 
96 Diffused 
urbanism labelled as “Zwischendstadt” by Sieverts, meaning “in-between-city” was claimed 
to be the “defining landscape” of cities in the 20th century regardless of economic power or 
urbanism-history backgrounds of countries. Sieverts in his definition implies that the cities 
no longer have traditional cores with “recognizable peripheries” but rather “polycentric 
webs” that cannot be qualified as either core or periphery.97 Anthropologist Gregory Guldin, 
however, regards this issue as the “blending of rural and urban,” but mostly emphasizes the 
density of transactions and networks that connect large urban cores to their surroundings.98
                                                 
94 In the original text the word “çağdaş” was used which can be translated as modern, but in this 
context it mainly means civilized.  
 
Furthermore, a rather ecological case study on urban growth in Argentina describes regions 
95 Sadi Özdemir, “6.7 katrilyona kanmayın ‘mega köy’ü unutmayın.”  
Hürriyet, February 22, 2004, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/02/22/416883.asp (accessed March 
27, 2009). 
96 Davis, p. 9. 
97 Ibid. 
98  Davis, p. 9. 
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where urban and rural interactions were made as “periurban.”99 The periurban system was 
not evaluated as rural or urban but as an interface of both, where urban services such as 
drinking water, electricity, sewer system, pavement or garbage collection were not offered 
efficiently100 and rural benefits like “capacity to absorb carbon dioxide” or “to regulate water 
flows, to absorb, store, and distribute short-term river flooding” scarcely existed.101
To sum up these ideas from various disciplines, it is necessary to examine the most 
dominant factors influencing the urban landscape in Turkish cities, the migration and 
gecekondu trend, together with the two different development policies that were followed in 
Turkey throughout the 20th century. With reference to Lefebvre’s hierarchical classification 
mentioned above, it is useful to compare how policies before and after the Second World war  
affected the city sphere while acknowledging Harvey on the importance of social tone in the 
urbanization process.  
 Thus, 
nurturing of additional urban cores and spread of urban agglomeration threatening the natural 
borders of city development (forested areas and water sources), caused a shift in urbanscape 
of Istanbul from its historical urban core, the Golden Horn, to various others (Beşiktaş-Şişli-
Kağıthane, Bakırköy, Kadıköy, Avcılar, Üsküdar, Kartal) during the second half of the 20th 
century (Fig. 11).   
 
                                                 
99 Gutman, P., G. Gutman, and A. Dascal. 1987. El campo en la ciudad: La produccidn agricola en el 
Gran Bue-nos Aires. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Centre for Urban and Regional Studies. Quoted in: Jorge 
Morello, Silvia Diana Matteucci and Andrea Rodriguez. "Sustainable Development and Urban Growth in the 
Argentine Rampas Region," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 590, 
Rethinking Sustainable Development (November 2003), p.120.   
100 Rodriguez, A. F. 1997. Cambios de uso de suelos en el entoro periurbano del Gran Buenos Aires: 
Estudio de usos de neoecosistemas y ecosistemas residuales en al area no urbana del partido de Berazategui. 
Licenciatura Thesis, School of Philosophy and Literature, University of Buenos Aires. Quoted in: Morello, 
Matteucci, and Rodriguez, p.120. 
101 Morello, Matteucci, and A. Rodriguez, p.120. 
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Figure 4- The various gecekondu settlements around the Istanbul Motorway. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan.  
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Figure 5- Zeyrek, an abandoned historical neighborhood in Istanbul with its new informal dwellers. Photos by Gizem 
Akdoğan. 
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Figure 6- An insight to a gecekondu neighborhood. The houses were built near the numerous small industries. Sanayi 
Mahallesi [Industry-Neighborhood] in Istanbul. Photos by Gizem Akdoğan. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Two main arguments are put forward here. First, uneven development of Turkey due 
to the abandoning of etatist policies was the most important catalyst prompting the massive 
movement of people to urban centers. Second, the sprawl process of gecekondu 
neighborhoods and their evolution in Istanbul has been closely linked with the increasing 
foreign influence on Turkey and capitalist investments of the rightist DP and its ideological 
heirs. It is useful to provide some historical background on Turkey, including developments 
achieved in the first half of the 20th century, to be able to make comparisons with the 
achievements made in the period of 1945-1960, the post-war period.  
To be able to comprehend the impacts of the transitions from etatism and modernism 
in Turkey from 1950s onward, it is important to develop an understanding of the conditions 
prior to World War II and to locate where Turkey stood in relation to the global trends. 
Going back to the end of the seventeenth century, when the enlightened states of Europe 
were already “championing” the needs and interests of the urban population that consisted of 
merchants and manufacturers over the rural population of peasants and farmers,102
                                                 
102 C. E. Black, “The Politics of Modernization” in “The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in 
Comparative History,” (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967); p.70. 
 the 
Ottoman economy was still oriented forward the opportunities to come from winning on the 
battlefield, until the Ottomans lost to the Russians in 1699. Some Ottoman rulers in the 18th 
and 19th centuries had attempts to modernize the transportation system or the army, but they 
lacked to materialize a broader modernization scheme. The anticipated social change was 
initiated after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk came to power in the 1920s. Thus, socio-economic 
development of Turkey is very recent and quite a radical one that had to occur in a very short 
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period of time. The observation Samuel Jameson made a decade after the founding of the 
Turkish Republic still keeps its reliability, for he noted that “it was impossible to know the 
real Turkey; even the Turks themselves do not know it. Turkey is a process; it is in the 
making; it is becoming.”103  As a consequence, the meanings of certain notions in the 
developing world is quite different from the developed world where the economic surpluses 
created by industries, development of cities, and the emergence of “modernization” is spread 
over the centuries and well-absorbed by their societies. According to the modernization 
theory by Black, the earlier the societies were to modernize, the easier it had been to “digest 
new knowledge and technology” and to “absorb the impact gradually.”104
In Turkey, during the Atatürk era, what is observed is a struggle to catch up with the 
industrialized and modernized countries under the umbrella of Kemalist nationalism; the 
“etatism policy” aimed an economic and social catch up and the promotion of modernism 
aimed to strengthen the break with the traditionalistic life of an agrarian society. Hence, 
when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in November 1938, Turkey not only lost the first 
president of the Republic, it was definitely much more than that. Regarded as the genius of 
 Therefore, when 
examining the cases in the developing world, it should not be forgotten that it was the long 
history of the modern knowledge, ideas and techniques that prepared the ground for the 
Industrial Revolution in the West whereas the underdeveloped countries in the first half of 
the 20th century “imported” the Western achievements after realizing that they could not 
compete with the West economically and scientifically.  
                                                 
103 Samuel Haig Jameson, "Social Mutation in Turkey," Social Forces, vol. 14, no. 4, (May 1936) : 
p.482.  
104 Black, p. 69. 
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his century by many including the English Prime Minister David Lloyd George,105 Atatürk 
first came into the public sphere as a successful commander in the First World War. 
Following the division of the Ottoman land by the Allied Powers after the war, Atatürk 
became a leader to his people as he managed to unify Turks under the ideal of independence. 
Finally, Atatürk strove to achieve socio-political reforms by founding the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly on the way to establishing the Republic of Turkey and by abolishing the 
six century old Sultanate together with the Caliphate. The reforms, signifying the imprint of 
Atatürk and his political party, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), ranged from replacing 
of the traditional dress code with the modern one to changing of the Arabic script to Latin, 
and to the enactment of women’s suffrage and electoral rights even before most of the 
Western states had extended the vote to women. The reforms made by Atatürk’s leadership 
sought to minimize the social and physical structural differences among the citizens within 
Turkey as well as between the Turks and the developed societies of the West. The sick man 
of Europe106 was reborn by the first quarter of the twentieth century. This historic turning 
point was regarded as the awakening of the “dormant Turkoman” after the shock of World 
War I.107
As exemplified in other revolutions in world history, the Turkish revolution, too, had 
an intellectual background established as early as 1878 with the formation of Jön Türkler 
[Jeune Turcs-Young Turks] whom were once tagged as “rebels” until the nationalistic 
 Thus; this national awakening set the foundations of an increasing conscience to 
develop national industries that could compete with that of the developed nations’. 
                                                 
105 British Prime Minister David Lloyd George statement on Atatürk was: "The centuries rarely 
produce a genius. It is our bad luck that the great genius of our era was granted to the Turkish nation." 
106 “The sick man of Europe” was a widely used term for the Ottoman Empire during its decline as a 
world power. 
107 Jameson, p. 483. 
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policies of Mustafa Kemal Pasha began to be realized.108 Turkish nationalism was indeed a 
rebellion at the time; primarily because the Ottoman citizens were not classified by their 
ethnicities but by their religions under the Ottoman law. Furthermore, there was a distinctive 
European influence and support over Christian subjects living in the Ottoman Empire. The 
pressure of the European interference was so severe that the period of Regulations, Tanzimat, 
had begun (in 1856) giving the non-Muslim minorities many rights and privileges. From this 
time onward, the European imperialists valued any excuse that they could use to interfere 
with the Ottoman Empire’s internal affairs under the name of protecting the rights of the 
minorities.109 Even though the European imperialists were interfering, not only were non-
Muslim subjects already free to practice their religion and hold many rights, they were also 
by and large the merchants and tradesmen of the vast Ottoman Empire by custom whereas 
the Muslims were directed more toward agrarian activities, government or military services 
while some of them worked in industries.110
During the Tanzimat Era, the imperialist Europeans also extended their rights in the 
capitulations,, which were forced to be given by the Ottoman state. The indulgences that 
were given with the capitulations were causing all manufactured goods to come to the 
Ottoman land tax-free from certain European countries, which in return blocked nurturing of 
 
                                                 
108 Jameson, p. 484.  
109 Jameson, p. 485. 
110 According to Shaw’s study on the occupation of the Istanbul’s residents as of 1885 showed that 95 
percent of the state services were conducted by Muslims. In the same table, 62 percent of trade, commerce and 
industry was seemed to be the occupation of the non-Muslims. Stanford J. Shaw, "The Population of Istanbul in 
the Nineteenth Century," p. 271.  
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local industries.111
 
 Therefore, in the pre-Republican Era, the Ottomans were under the direct 
influence of the more developed economies. 
From Etatism to Uneven Development 
By contrast to the general opinion that etatism approach in Turkish economy began in 
the 1920s, it actually did not. The early Republican economy had two phases; the first was 
between 1923 to the Great Depression of 1929 and the second was from 1929 to the 
beginning of the Second World War in 1939. In the first phase, Turkey was forced to 
function as a market economy due to its limited capital and experience but also because there 
was no other successful economic development model at that time other than Western 
capitalism.112 Furthermore, the Lausanne Treaty placed some restrictions (such as trade 
tariffs) on Turkey’s economy.113 The private-sector was encouraged to make investments and 
taxing the peasants was avoided to be able to realize industrial growth.114 However, the 
Turkish economy was still primarily dependent upon agriculture, exported “primary 
commodities” and kept importing “manufactured” items until the Great Depression.115
                                                 
111 Fräulein Lilo Linke, "Social Changes in Turkey," International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 4, (July 1937): 
p.542.  
 When 
the global Great Depression began in 1929, the “world-wide collapse of capitalism” gave a 
112 Suna Kili, "Kemalism in the Contemporary Turkey," International Political Science Review / Revue 
internationale de science politique, vol. 1, no. 3, Political Ideology: Its Impact on Contemporary Political 
Transformations (1980): p.390.  
113 Ali Bayar, "The Developmental State and Economic Policy in Turkey," Third World Quarterly, vol. 
17, no. 4, The Developmental State?: Democracy, Reform and Economic Prosperity in the Third World in the 
Nineties (1996) : p.774.  
114 Bayar, "The Developmental State and Economic Policy in Turkey," p. 774.  
115 Çağlar Keyder, The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929 (Cambridge, 1981). 
Quoted in: Morris Singer, "The Economic Performance of the Turkish Republic," Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 
20, no. 4, (October 1984): p.155.  
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new direction to the Turkish administration.116 This new direction was also inevitable since 
Turkey’s major agricultural exports (cereals, tobacco, and cotton) had a significant price fall 
which in turn caused popular discontent.117 Additionally, the limitations of the Lausanne 
Treaty on Turkish economic development had expired by that time.118 However, during the 
first period of the early Republican economy, studies were also being made to improve 
economic conditions; an economic congress was held in Izmir in 1923 that was followed by 
the establishment of the Business Bank of Turkey119
The second phase of the economic era is marked by the Kemalist principle of etatism 
which was declared during Congress of the ruling Republican People’s Party in 1931 
together with five other principles of nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism and 
reformism which were also included in the Constitution later on in 1937. Etatism, as 
mentioned before, evolved in a new nation-state eager to establish its own industries and in a 
period when the capitalist model had experienced world-wide failure. Some argued that 
etatism was a socialist model; however, the large private firms’ value of output grew from 
1932 to 1939 by a “factor of about 2.4.”
 in 1924 which gave credits to business 
owners, and a special law in 1927 that aimed to encourage industries was enacted.  
120
                                                 
116 William Hale, "Ideology and Economic Development in Turkey 1930-1945," Bulletin (British 
Society for Middle Eastern Studies), vol. 7, no. 2, (1980): p.105.  
 Furthermore, even though there were state-owned 
enterprises for textile production, “65 percent of the output of cotton products, 40 percent of 
117 Osman Okyar, "Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923-1973" International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, (August 1979 ): p.327. 
118 Bayar, p. 775.   
119 The original name of the bank in Turkish is Türkiye İş Bankası. 
120 Melek Düzgüneş, ed., Türkiye’de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Gelişmenin 50 Yılı [in English: 50 Years 
of Social and Economical Development in Turkey], pp.167, 175, (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü [in 
English: State Institute of Statistics], 1973). Quoted in: Hale, p. 111. 
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wool products or 45 percent of cement” were due to private firms.121 Nonetheless, as a model 
it kept encouraging the private initiative while it also gave responsibility to the state to track 
development opportunities, and reach regions in which the private sector was not interested. 
Etatism was based on national industries and Turkish entrepreneurship. As such, some 
changes were deemed necessary to be made. For example, the railroad transportation, 
banking system, and industrial firms belonged to foreigners. Therefore, the economic agenda 
consisted of establishing state owned banks, building factories, and obtaining technical 
assistance from advanced countries. However, sociologically, the Turks by no means were an 
enterprising people;122 if there were some who were interested in entrepreneurialism, it was 
mostly commercial not industrial.123
In order to mobilize the economy, Turkey’s first Five-Year Development Plan was 
devised in 1933, which initiated the realizations of the import-subsidy industries 
 Thus, the Turkish state had found it necessary to 
interfere with the industrialization process.  
124 in iron 
and steel, textiles, paper, ceramics, glass, and chemical products.125
                                                 
121 Hale, p. 111. 
 Nevertheless, what the 
Turkish administration had been longing for by 1933 was a wide-ranging economic survey 
from an expert team. That team leader selected for this special study was Walker D. Hines, a 
famous economic expert of his time as the director of the American railroads operations 
during World War I.  Hines’ study included his legal associates Goldthwaite H. Dorr and H. 
Alexander Smith together with experts in fields of agriculture and engineering. However, 
since Hines died in 1934, Dorr took over his role and completed the survey with Edwin W. 
122 Linke, p. 542.  
123 Bayar, p. 775.   
124 Hale, p. 101.  
125 Bayar, p. 775.   
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Kemmerer of Princeton University in the same year. The long report had clarified 
achievements but also set goals to accomplish; according to this report, Turkey’s utmost need 
was to increase efficiency in production by implementing better transportation and 
communication systems, and to modernize agriculture and transportation, instead of 
extensive industrialization. Julian Gillespie, as the U.S. commercial attaché in Istanbul, 
heavily critiqued this report and urged governments to not to limit their efficiency and quality 
goals with agriculture alone.126
The etatist development plan caused for creating work opportunities in different 
regions of the country. In the middle of Central Anatolia, Ankara was being transformed 
from a small town into a symbolic capital of Turkish modernization with its wide boulevards, 
cultural buildings and civil projects;
 However, the implementations of the report’s goals would be 
seen later on in the 1950s in accordance to increasing American economic influence in 
Turkey. 
127 furthermore, the government chose sites in Western 
and Central Anatolia to locate twelve of the fourteen new state owned investments instead of 
the former Ottoman capital of Istanbul.128
In the first Five-Year Development Plan, Eastern Anatolia could not get enough 
attention. However, developing the east of Turkey was very essential for the new state due to 
strategic reasons; first, its general character was more nomadic due to lack of enough plains 
 Yet because of its geographic and strategic 
superiority, Istanbul still received two state owned factories in addition to some others that 
already existed in the region.  
                                                 
126 Roger R. Trask, “The United States and Turkish Nationalism: Investments and Technical Aid 
during the Ataturk Era,” The Business History Review, vol. 38, no. 1, (Spring, 1964): p.74.  
127 Evered, p. 333-337.  
128 Okyar, p. 329.  
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for agricultural production, less developed due to nomadic life style and retarded government 
investment, and politically attractive for external and internal agents’ manipulations due to 
existence of Kurdish ethnic groups.  Moreover, Eastern Anatolia lacked an efficient 
transportation system, for the accessibility of the railroad system built during the Ottoman 
period was mainly limited to coastal regions.129 Thus, due to the fact that the railroad system 
in the South-eastern and Eastern Anatolia was underdeveloped, transportation of the 
necessary raw materials to the prospective industries or rather transportation of the 
manufactured goods to other Turkish cities and ports would not be possible. Additionally, the 
new Turkish state had very scarce capital to begin with; for that reason, the cities that were 
already within close proximity to a transportation link and nearby raw materials were given 
priority in the First-Five Year Development Plan. Yet the state did not lose time in making 
essential investments to encourage industrialization and further development of Anatolia. 
Without borrowing any external funds,130 the Kemalist regime of the Early-Republican Era 
achieved the extension of 1904.6 miles of the existing 2484.8 miles long railroad system 
which was previously built over the period of 1860-1918.131
                                                 
129 Schoenberg, p. 368. 
 This project finally made it 
possible to connect the major cities in the Central Anatolia, Black Sea, and Eastern Anatolia 
regions with the existing lines that were in the regions of Erzurum-Kars, the Iranian border, 
the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Marmara Coast. As a consequence, when the Second 
Five-Year Development was prepared for the period of 1938-1943, the main focus was 
130 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “İnşaat [in English: Construction]: 
İnşaat Kesiminin Gelişimi [in English: The Development of the Construction Sector].” 
131 John Kolars and Henry J. Malin, "Population and Accessibility: An Analysis of Turkish Railroads," 
Geographical Review, vol. 60, no. 2, (April, 1970): p.239.  
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placed on the development of heavy-industries132 and the construction of more than one 
hundred state owned projects133
The industries of the Kemalist regime were more than being industrial facilities; they 
were the symbols of “modernization” and “secularization” of a society that was 
approximately 80 percent agrarian. Fräulein Lilo Linke as a European traveling to Turkey in 
1935 noted that the Kayseri Bez Fabrikası [Kayseri Textile Factory]-the first state owned 
plant-
 were foreseen to be located all around Turkey. However, 
since the war broke out, the Second-Five Year Plan was never truly implemented. 
134 was a very pleasant place which was “very well lighted, well-aired, and with all 
modern conveniences of showers, baths, 
cloak-rooms, canteens with well-cooked 
cheap food.” Linke also added that there 
were housing units that could give 
accommodation to seven hundred workers’ 
families together with “an enormous sports 
ground, football fields, tennis-courts, a 
swimming-pool, riding grounds, a 
gymnasium and so on.”135
                                                 
132 Hale, p. 101. 
  Asiliskender 
states that there were also public-spaces like 
an infirmary, cinema, markets, and schools 
133 Bayar, p. 775.   
134 Burak Asiliskender, "Installing ‘Modern’ life style with architecture: A Case of Sümerbank Kayseri 
Settlement," Revista de crítica arquitectònica, núm. 13-14, (2005): p.218. 
135 Linke, p. 544. 
Figure 5-A Perspective Drawing of the Powerhouse in the 
Kayseri Textile Factory. Source: Asiliskender, p.222. 
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and small agricultural plots left to be planted by the families of the laborers but noted that the 
residences were to accommodate one hundred 55 officials and 2,100 workers with their 
families.136 When Linke discussed her concerns about the usability of these facilities with the 
director of the factory, the director explained to her that their purpose of building these 
facilities was not to turn the workers “into robots nor into a class-conscious proletariat, but 
into self-respecting citizens who would be aware of the fact that the factory was owned by 
the State, and therefore was their property, and that the better they worked, the better they 
would live themselves.”137 From the observations Linke made of special classes, social and 
educational clubs, and various sports activities, she then agreed with the optimism of 
prediction of the director.138 Kayseri Textile Factory building or rather the industrial complex 
was used as an example of an ideal “modern” settlement where the facilities and planning 
scheme aimed to create a healthy work and living environment both physically and 
psychologically. This insistence on “modernity” was also evident in architecture of the 
buildings in the industry complex; they were very modern with the extensive use of strict 
geometric forms, lack of ornaments, and material choices. However, the use of modern 
architecture by the state-hand was not only limited to industry plants and their regional 
development schemes. Since “modern” architecture was regarded as a symbol of “national 
independence, pride and progress,”139
                                                 
136 Asiliskender, p. 221.  
 the general character of the government buildings built 
in that period mostly tended to be modern.  
137 Linke, p. 545. 
138 Linke, p. 545. 
139 Sibel Bozdoğan,   Modernism and Nation Building:  Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early 
Republic, p.10.  (Singapore: University of Washington Press,  2001) 
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The economic expectation behind these state owned industries, which were to 
substitute essential imports (import-subsidy industry model), was to reduce the amount and 
variety of imported goods from abroad. Hale’s study showed that before the new tariffs were 
introduced in 1929, textiles, clothing, and sugar made up 44.7 percent of Turkey’s imports, 
whereas metals, machinery, and vehicles were only 20.2 percent. In 1939, the share of the 
imported goods reversed to 19.2 percent and 42.5 percent respectively because, the import 
substituting industries enabled the state to keep its foreign exchange for the import of 
“investment goods”140 such as metals, machinery, and vehicles.  From 1932 to 1939, the 
industry’s contribution to GDP grew from 16 percent to 18 percent while Turkey’s real GDP 
itself grew by an average of 8 percent a year. Consequently, the numbers indicate that the 
etatism policy worked efficiently until 1939.141 By contrast, when there was severe shortage 
of “imported machinery, spare parts, and raw materials, which the industrialized countries 
were reserving for their own” following the outbreak of World War II142, the growth trend in 
the Turkish economy was reversed, causing an average of 6.9 percent GDP decline per 
annum during the war period.143 The reflection of the state economy was also felt in the city 
scale. It was noted that the cost of living index for Istanbul, increased from a base of 100 in 
1939 to 354 in 1945.144
 
  
                                                 
140 Hale, p. 108. 
141 Hale, p. 108. 
142 Hale, p. 109. 
143 Hale, p. 109. 
144 Hale, p. 109. 
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Foreign Influence and the Capitalist Shift 
Since Turkey’s import-substituting industrialization policy’s first part had 
commenced when Atatürk was alive, the state continued the production in the state-owned 
enterprises and made the essential products available in the Turkish market during World 
War II.145 Yet, the private sector’s productivity both in agriculture and industry declined 
during the war, causing a reduction in supply and increase in demand for goods and services 
by the government which resulted with a “four-fold rise in price levels” during the war 
years.146 By 1941, the government147 had to use the “karne”148 system as a way to control the 
public demand for certain goods such as bread, flour, or sugar, which as a social memory is 
still told to new generations149
Even though there was a single party rule in Turkey, President Atatürk had made 
attempts to encourage the foundation of opposition parties, especially when the country was 
struck by the global financial crisis. By that time, economist Fethi Okyar, who was in favor 
of greater free enterprise rather than less, became the first leader of an opposition party, the 
 in Turkey. Therefore, the economic conditions worsened by 
the war together with other political pressures made the single-party rule in Turkey more 
problematic both for the people and the RPP government.  
                                                 
145 Singer, p. 156.  
146 Singer, p. 156. 
147 Following the death of Atatürk in November 1938, İsmet İnönü-the former prime minister and a 
most relied upon friend Atatürk took the president’s seat near the time the World War II began. As a military 
officer who took major roles in the Turkish War of Independence, İnönü avoided entering Turkey into another 
war. This was also due to the motto of Turkish foreign policy; a famous statement of Atatürk, “peace at home, 
peace in the world.” However, the increasing pressure from the Allies for Turkey to stop trading with Germany 
and the expectations of Great Britain and the U.S. for Turkey to act as an ally resulted with Turkey’s entrance to 
WWII in 1945. 
148 Karne in Turkish is used for describing the “voucher” system used during World War II, by the 
İnönü government, which aimed to control the public demand and supply of certain commodities. However, the 
voucher system resulted in high demand for the black market during the war era.  
149 The empty shelves in the grocery stores or long queues in front of the bakeries are such memories.  
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Free Party, in 1930.150 However, the party’s political life did not last long because it became 
a party for people who were against the Kemalist social secularization projects which 
symbolized the essential values of the Republic. 151 When once again the country’s economy 
was badly affected from another global crisis, the Second World War, President İsmet İnönü 
approved the opening of other political parties as well. The DP, just like the short-lived Free 
Party, had a capitalist orientation rather than etatist. In the elections of 1946, the DP could 
only win one seventh of the votes, but in four years, the party was able to form the 
government.152
The post-World War II era was quite a challenge for Turkey, first due to the Soviet 
pressure and territorial claims on the control of the Straits and on the north-eastern border 
towns of Kars and Ardahan
 Thus, Atatürk’s initial goal of implementing the multi-party system in order 
to achieve greater democracy was finally realized in 1946.  
153 and second due to the economic devastation of Germany,154 
Turkey’s major trade partner. Hence, under these circumstances, Turkey chose to align with 
the United States and Western Europe. At that point, to prevent further spread of communism 
and block Soviet pressure in Turkey (and Greece), the U.S. Congress signed Public Law 75 
in 1947, commonly known as the Truman Doctrine, which proposed a military and economic 
aid package for Greece and Turkey.155
                                                 
150 Hale, p. 103. 
  Soon after the U.S. Secretary of State Marshall 
announced an economic plan and the Economic Recovery Act for Western Europe, aid was 
151 Hale, p. 103. 
152 Bayar, p. 776. 
153 Joseph C. Satterthwaite, “The Truman Doctrine: Turkey,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 401, America and the Middle East, (May, 1972): p.77. 
154 A. C. Edwards notes that “the war has brought another serious economic injury to Turkey- it has 
deprived her of her best customer and most effective supplier.” Edwards, p. 390. 
155 Satterthwaite, p. 74. 
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also approved for Turkey (together with Greece) in 1948.156
 The “Marshall Aid’’ projected the introduction of more farm machinery and 
technological methods in order “to achieve a level somewhat higher than is possible under a 
subsistence village economy.”
 This aid which proposed 
technical expertise and financial means for Turkey would also accelerate internal migration 
pattern in Turkey.  
157 Three months prior to the Marshall Aid’s arrival in July 
1948, Turkey became a member of Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC). With the acceptance of the foreign aid, Hershlag (a well-known writer on Turkish 
economics) asserts that “a country full of nationalist apprehensions and feelings of isolation” 
experienced a fundamental shift in the theoretical framework of the etatism of the thirties.158 
Mustafa Aydın notes that in terms of economics and foreign policy, the era of 1945-1960 was 
marked with Turkey’s total dependence on the West.159
However, if referring back to the American experts’ report on the Turkish 
economy,
 Therefore, the transition from the 
period of etatism to a more Western influenced economy model was initiated in respect to 
global changes.  
160
                                                 
156 Satterthwaite, p. 81.  
 Trask mentions that when Dorr visited Turkey again in 1949 and in 1950, he 
learnt from the officials that Hines-Dorr-Kemmerer report had been the Turkish 
157 Robinson, p. 397.  
158 Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey: The Challenge of Growth (2nd ed.; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p.136. Quoted 
in: Okyar, p. 337. 
159 Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures 
during the Cold War,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 36, no.1, (January, 2000): p.105, 110.  
160 As mentioned earlier, the report had highlighted that Turkey should mechanize agriculture, increase 
productivity, and improve the road network.  
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government’s “Bible.”161 The appreciation of this report in the post-war period was not 
surprising at all, given the political and economic shift of Turkey to the Western bloc. 
Furthermore, the appreciation of Turkish government officials is strongly related to the new 
class formation composed of industrialists and traders that evolved with the industrialization 
of Turkey, under the “etatism” policies. As Parvin and Hiç notes the new economic class had 
challenged the “supremacy of the bureaucrats and the military” while the “large landowners, 
who occupied a considerable number of seats in the parliament” alienated themselves from 
the “intensified” etatism policies after Atatürk’s death.162 The Prime Minister Menderes was 
one of those landowners in the parliament and was quite unpleased with the Republicans’ 
land distribution law of the mid 1940s; thus, his government altered the law for the 
distribution of public lands but not the redistribution of the private ones.163Therefore, the 
Democrat Party denounced etatism in favor of more liberal economic policies, rejected land 
reform but promoted agricultural reform. 164
The economy under the DP went through two phases as well. In the first phase, due to 
the increased rate of the lands in cultivation,
  
165 the agricultural sector managed to produce 
surpluses. Owing much to the good weather conditions during 1948-1953,166
                                                 
161 Curti and Birr, Prelude to Point Four, p.184; William Phillips to General Douglas A. MacArthur 
(Chief of Staff), April 11, 1933, DS 867.50A/ 14A (about Somervell). Quoted in: Trask, p.75.  
 the 
mechanization of agriculture, and the elimination of taxes, the agriculture grew at an annual 
162 Manoucher Parvin and Mukerrem Hiç, “Land Reform versus Agricultural Reform: Turkish Miracle 
or Catastrophe Delayed?,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, (May, 1984): p.212.  
163 Singer, p. 157. 
164 Parvin, Hic, p.212.  
165 J. K. Eastham, “The Turkish Development Plan: The First Five Years,” The Economic Journal, vol. 
74, no.293, (March, 1964): p.132.  
166 Okyar, p. 331. 
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rate of 11.5%167 in the period of 1950-1953.168 After OEEC membership, due to the 
regulations, the Menderes government enabled free-trade with the other member countries, 
which rose by 75 percent. Since there were agricultural surpluses and new trade regulations, 
Turkey’s export rate increased in this period. What is more, despite the import rate increasing 
more than that of the export rate, there was an overall growth in the economy.169 Morris 
Singer notes the expansion of the Turkish economy as a whole to be 11 percent per annum 
between 1950 and 1953.170 In 1954, Turkish parliament passed a law to encourage foreign 
investment (Code no. 6224) in Turkey which was regarded to be a very liberal policy, 
because with this law (that was prepared by the American experts), the Turkish market 
allowed foreign investments not only as capital but also in the form of machinery, equipment, 
license and even as patent rights.171 However, in the second phase, agricultural production 
fell and so did the export rate of Turkey. Moreover, due to huge international loans 
previously used in the first stage of the DP administration, the economy underwent into a 
serious crisis because Turkey was no longer able to borrow any more funds from abroad.172
                                                 
167 Singer gave a close figure stating that the agricultural growth for the period of 1950-1953 was 12 
percent a year.  Singer, p. 158. 
 
After damaging its reputation, spending all the foreign exchange that was not spent during 
the war, digging Turkey into foreign debt, politicizing religion, and with the rise of anti-
Americanism within Turkey, the DP government was removed from the parliament with the 
military coup of 1960.  
168 Bayar, p. 776. 
169 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Imalat Sanayi [Production 
Industry]: 1950’lerde Ekonomi Politikaları [in English: The Economic Policies in the 1950s].” 
170 Singer, p. 158. 
171 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Imalat Sanayi [Production 
Industry]: 1950’lerde Ekonomi Politikalari [in English: The Economic Policies in the 1950s].” 
172 Bayar, p. 777. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
It is evident that during the period of 1945-1960, the American technical and 
economic help sped up the technological development of the Turkish army, the construction 
of all-weather roads, which increased accessibility, and the progress of especially the 
machinery industry in Turkey. Osman Okyar mentions that since the military financial 
burden on the Turkish economy was lessened as a result of the U.S. aid, the “flow of 
resources available for investment” whether directly or indirectly increased.173 However, in 
the 1950s, the income distribution gap was widened as the “share of the wage-earners in the 
G.N.P.” fell by 7 percent for agriculture and by 22 percent for the employees working in state 
enterprises.174
 
 Similar to Kuznets’ industrialization theory that was mentioned earlier for an 
agrarian society, the liberalization era’s first outcome would be the income inequality 
following the economic growth of some sectors. Since there was widening income inequality, 
the next step of the social transition in the form of the rural-to-urban migration pattern would 
then commence in modern Turkey.  
Easing Migration in the 1950s 
During the DP governance, the state began to direct its attention more towards the 
infrastructure projects and mechanization of agriculture.175
                                                 
173 Okyar, p. 331. 
 This outcome was not unexpected 
in the given economic approach of the DP. Previously, the DP criticized the direct state 
interference with productive activities as the party argued that the involvement of the state 
174 Eastham, p. 132-133. 
175 Bayar, p. 776. 
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should be limited to infrastructure investments for energy, water, communications, and 
transport.176 Thus, in the public construction priority was given to the construction of power 
plants which enabled Turkey to almost triple its energy production in the 1950s.177 Investing 
in the energy sector (like the road constructions) aimed to attract the private sector’s interest. 
However, one of the most significant and debated projects of the 1950s was the 
“reconstruction” of Istanbul, which contradicted with the former governments’ attention 
toward Ankara, the new capital. Some 7,000 houses were demolished in Istanbul178
The other major change during the 1950s in Turkey was the augmentation of the farm 
machinery and motorized vehicles which as an outcome sped up the detachment of rural 
work force and migration to urban centers. In the mid 1920s, the state encouraged farmers to 
purchase tractors and other kinds of farm machinery, but as mentioned earlier and as can be 
seen from the figures below, the significant increase in the number of farm machinery 
 in order 
to install public squares or widen the existing roads; however, the state did not provide 
housing for the owners of the demolished houses and failed to compensate the owner’s 
economic loss. It was again during Istanbul’s “reconstruction” that many historical buildings 
and public fountains were removed elsewhere within Istanbul from their original locations or 
were demolished completely. Menderes’ “reconstruction” project also had negative effects 
on the poor due to the rise of the real estate prices.  
                                                 
176 Okyar, p. 332. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “İnşaat [in English: Construction]: 
İnşaat Kesiminin Gelişimi [in English: The Development of the Construction Sector].” 
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occurred when Turkey started to receive external aids and credits (Table-2).  In addition, the 
number of motorized vehicles in 1950 was 36,000 but in 1960 it reached up to 100,000.179
Table 2-Total Farm Machinery in Turkey, by Type, for the Years 1948, 1952, 1954 
  
Machines 1948 1952 1954 
Tractors 1,756 31,415 37,740 
Plows (tractor drawn) 1,472 30,766 38,000 
Disc harrows (tractor drawn) 680 9,623 14,097 
Cultivators (tractor drawn) 401 4,028 5,075 
Trailers 140 12,982 18,088 
Trucks … 1,178 1,300 
Source: Reşat Aktan, “Mechanization of Agriculture in Turkey,” Land Economics, vol.33, no. 4 (November, 
1957), p. 276. 
 
 
The outcome of augmenting farm machinery was to be seen in the following years 
with the decrease of labor demand in agriculture. If a tractor would be able to substitute up to 
10 workers and if the number of tractors used in agriculture increased from 961 in 1936 to 
40,282 in 1955,180
                                                 
179 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Yerleşme Düzeni ve Kentleşme 
[in English: Planning and Urbanization]: Nüfusun Kır-Kent Birleşimi [in English: The Population’s Rural-
Urban Combination].” 
 Robinson optimistically estimated that at least 2 of every 10 families that 
made a living from agriculture could find a job in the rural areas by opening a small store- a 
“coffee shop” for example, if the competition allows, “a service station if he could get a 
franchise,” if he has any specific skill maybe a “craft shop” of some kind and maybe a 
180 Şenyapılı, p. 118. 
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“restaurant” if his village is by the highway.181
In addition to the labor force that worked in the farms, the futures of another group of 
people also changed with the introduction of tractors and other machinery in agriculture.  
This group was the small farm owners who were not able to get credits from Ziraat 
[Agricultural] Bank in order to own a tractor because their properties were often too little to 
be counted as an economic guaranty.
 This estimation leaves out the majority of 8 
families without a job in the rural areas who were tempted by the big cities opportunities. 
182 Furthermore, the operation of a tractor in a small 
field would not be very feasible in economical sense. As a result, the small farmers who 
could not compete with the big farm owners with machinery found the solution in selling 
their properties and using that money for migrating into big cities.183
Related to the developments in transportation, the passenger traffic “dramatically” 
increased as well; there was almost a seven-fold increase in the number of passengers 
travelling by road (Table-3).
  
184 With respect to the governments’ investment policies, the 
trends in the transportation system tended to change in favor of the road network starting 
with the 1950s; for this reason, the railroad’s share in passenger traffic sharply fell (Table-
4).185
                                                 
181 Robinson, p. 398. 
 The decrease in the passenger numbers travelling by railroad also fell due to the limited 
government spending on the construction of new railroads and technical upkeep. Since the 
governments changed their economic orientation after the Second World War, the railroads 
182 Şenyapılı, p. 118. 
183 Şenyapılı, p. 118. 
184 Robinson, p. 400. 
185 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Ulaştirma [in English: 
Transportation]: Ulaştirma Kesiminin Yapisi [in English: The Structure of the Transportation Sector].” 
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of the Early-Republican Era, which connected the different cities in the country,186
Table 3- Increase in the Passenger Traffic, for the Years 1948, 1955 
 gradually 
lost their importance. The map showing the construction of the railroads and their 
construction periods clearly explains the ideological shift (Table-5). 
 1948 1955 
Passenger-kms. by rail 2,545,800 3,917,300 
Passenger-kms. by road 1,211,070 8,090,000 
Source: Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” p.400.  
Table 4- Passenger Transportation Trends, for the Years 1955, 1980  
 
Source: Central Office of Statistics, Statistics of Transportation and Traffic Accidents, 1982. Referred in: Yurt 
Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Ulaştirma [in English: Transportation]: Ulaştirma Kesiminin 
Yapisi [in English: The Structure of the Transportation Sector].” 
                                                 
186 In the “Tenth Year March” composed for the tenth year celebrations of the Turkish Republic the 
railroads were also mentioned: “…Led by the Chief Commander who is respected by the whole world,\We 
weaved the motherland from all sides with the iron nets…”  
  
73.1%
24.0%
2.5% 0.4%
93.9%
5.6%
0.1% 0.4%
Road Railroad Sealine* Airline*
Shares of Passenger Transportation for the Year 1955
Shares of Passenger Transportation for the Year 1980
* Domestic
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To give some sort of hope to the unemployed rural workers, the “Marshall Aid” that 
helped enlarging the road network in Turkey, thus, made it easier to migrate to urban centers 
from the villages and little towns. Hence, the state road network length increased from 
47,080 km in 1950 to 61,542 km in 1960.187 All-weather roads were only 37 percent of the 
road network in 1952 and by 1960 it reached up to 63 percent.188 On the other hand, it had 
been stated by George McGhee,189 the U.S. government’s total contribution to Turkish road 
development by providing equipment and expertise from the U.S. Public Road 
Administration had been $27,600,000 the by the end of 1953 and with Turks’ own 
expenditure of $293,000,000 some thirteen thousand miles of all-weather road network was 
constructed by 1954.190 The expenditure by the Turkish government depended on outside 
sources and during the 1950s; five-million dollars from the total external debt would be the 
cost of the road construction machines alone.191
The rapid mechanization process in agriculture and the dramatic increase in the 
transportation network and passenger traffic led to rapid growth in urban centers; Robinson 
estimated that when the birth and death rates were assumed to remain the same during the 
five year period from 1950 to 1955, the increase in the percentage of people living in cities 
 Thus, the rapid growth actually depended a 
lot on the foreign loans.  
                                                 
187 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “İnşaat [in English: Construction]: 
İnşaat Kesiminin Gelişimi [in English: The Development of the Construction Sector].” 
188 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Yerleşme Düzeni ve Kentleşme 
[in English: Planning and Urbanization]: Nüfusun Kır-Kent Birleşimi [in English: The Population’s Rural-
Urban Combination].” 
189 George McGhee was the first Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey and later on he became the 
Ambassador to Turkey (1951-1953). 
190 Satterthwaite, p. 82. 
191 Yurt Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “İnşaat [in English: Construction]: 
İnşaat Kesiminin Gelişimi [in English: The Development of the Construction Sector].” 
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from 25.2 percent192 to 28.5 percent would be equal to 800,000 individuals.193 However, two 
years after his estimation in 1958, the final official figures showed that the actual increase in 
the urban population was from 22 percent in 1950 to 28.8 percent in 1955; from 4,593,261 
urbanites in 1950 to 6,927,343 urbanites in 1950.194
Before the 1950s, the rural and urban population growth rates tended to be more or 
less close to each other. As a result of the rural to urban migration in the 1950s and onward, 
the population growth in the rural areas had not been able to surpass the urban rates (Table-
5).  
 Therefore, the figures from the UN 
database, an additional some 2,300,000 individuals (not 800,000), make Robinson’s theory 
for the displaced breadwinners even more pessimistic. 
                                                 
192 With reference to Annuaire Statistique for 1951, publication no.332 of the Central Office of 
Statistics at Ankara [with the exception of Brice, authors generally translate it as State Institute of Statics], Brice 
also notes the percentage of the urban population as 25.2 percent. W. C. Brice, “The Population of Turkey in 
1950,” The Geographical Journal, Vol.120, No. 3, (September, 1954): p.347.  
193 Robinson, p. 399.  
194 The figures are not estimates but complete census reports included in the UN-data of demographics 
showing urban-rural population: UN-data, “Population by sex and urban/ rural residence,” 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=POP&f=tableCode:1 (accessed July 01, 2009). 
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Table 5- Urban and Rural Population Growth of Turkey (in thousands) 
 
Source: Central Office of Statistics, General Population Censuses for the Given Periods. Referred in: Yurt 
Ansiklopedisi [Encylopedia of the Country], 1984 ed., s.v., “Yerleşme Düzeni ve Kentleşme [in English: Planning and 
Urbanization]: Nüfusun Kır-Kent Birleşimi [in English: The Population’s Rural-Urban Combination].” 
 
 Migration indicates the unequal distribution of public services. Eastham notes that 
for the 1950s, there was one doctor for 675 persons in Istanbul, but for some eastern 
provinces, the rate could be as low as one doctor for 15,000;195 the same type of inequalities 
were also seen for “water, sanitation, electricity, health and transport services.”196 The State 
Planning Department’s study demonstrated the development levels of cities in Turkey for the 
year 2003 (Fig. 9); various factors such as economic indicators, literacy rate, health, 
transportation, and sanitation coverage and such were included during the estimations.197
                                                 
195 Eastham, p. 133. 
 In 
terms of development, there may be differences in real numbers for each year, but since this 
196 Eastham, p. 133. 
197 Dinçer, Özalsan and Kavasoğlu, p. 79. 
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map is a reflection of a longer period, the assumption may be made that the general 
boundaries of the development levels on a regional scale will not be likely to differ. There 
are also maps showing the migration pattern from other cities to Istanbul between, based on 
the population censuses, 1980 and 1985 (Fig.10-11-12). If the immigration maps to Istanbul 
are compared with the map showing the development levels of the cities, the relation 
between uneven development and migration would be seen. As expected, the least developed 
cities are the major sources of rural out-migration (Fig.11). Apart from the rural out-
migration, the significant urban out-migration pattern is from the developed cities of Ankara, 
Izmir, Antalya or Bursa to Istanbul. The migration from one developed city to another is 
generally urban-to-urban (Fig. 12); this can be attributed to migration of students and the 
middle strata (government officials, scholars, skilled workers, and so on), but also to the 
“chain migration” model where the migrant uses some cities as stepping stones toward 
his/her intended destination.  
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In terms of the housing policies in the period of 1945-1960, there was a relaxation of 
the government’s concern with and insistence upon the modern and healthy housing model 
and region planning as a reflection of the liberal orientation of the DP. The new private 
factories were established mostly in Istanbul; foreign investors chose the most accessible 
zones for their industries and firms in contrast to former state policy which aimed to offer 
“equal” opportunity of development to each region within Turkey.198 Since the immigration 
rates were high and there was an accommodation problem in the cities, the DP government 
tried to solve the housing problem for the poor with allowing gecekondu houses, and 
permitting densification of the existing neighborhoods or building of dense suburbs for the 
middle income groups via construction of multi-storey apartment buildings.199
 
 The outcomes 
of densification and expanding human print, and the pattern of sprawl from the historical 
urban core toward some distant settlements in the outskirts of Istanbul, which was initiated in 
the 1950s, can be seen for the years 1975, 1990, and 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 Ekinci, p. 19.  
199 Yasemin Alkışer, “Türkiye’de “Devlet Konutu”nun Dünü, Bugünü, Yarını [The Yesterday, Today, 
and Tomorrow of the State Housing in Turkey],” ITÜ Dergisi/A: Mimarlık, Planlama, Tasarım [Journal of 
ITU: Architecture, Planing, Design], vol. 3, no.1, (March, 2004); p.68.  
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Figure 11- Urban Spatial Development of Istanbul. Modified by Gizem Akdoğan.  
Source: Fatih Terzi, H. Serdar Kaya, “Analyzing Urban Sprawl Patterns Through Fractal Geometry: The 
Case of Istanbul Metropolitan Area,” UCL Working Papers Series, Paper 144, August 2008, London, p.12. 
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CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The Turkish case, as it is related to the informal economic sector and gecekondu 
sprawl in Istanbul, displays some strong connections between the political and economic 
agenda of the government’s impact on the urbanization process. As some previous studies 
also have suggested and argued, the significant rise of some modern sectors with foreign 
investment created a new class of people whose benefits were highly protected by the help of 
politics. After World War II, a “protective hand” reached from the other side of the world in 
order to “protect” Turkey from Soviet territorial and ideological “pressure.” The U.S. aid had 
tremendous positive influence in terms of training military personnel, providing up-to-date 
military equipment, and expanding regional accessibility within Turkey. Furthermore, the 
financial aid directed towards agriculture and infrastructure encouraged the private sector’s 
rise in Turkey starting from the 1950s.  
However, while these policies were realized, the human factor was largely neglected; 
there were lack of investments for the displaced peasants, in terms of creating jobs or housing 
options. The former urbanites had to share the urban resources with the newcomers: the 
parks, buildings, streets, schools, hospitals, cinemas, busses, ferries; and even the electricity, 
drinking water and air in the city. Hence, it is debatable whether or not the very liberal 
policies of the DP were economically or politically sound decisions. As the expansions of 
gecekondu housing during the last few decades is observable, however, the liberal policies of 
the DP and other rightist-parties caused a major deterioration of Istanbul in terms of its 
historical architecture, historical urban core, urban planning, and natural environment.  
Istanbul has been polished up, promoted to be the dreamy capital of the Ottomans to attract 
foreigners; however, as a city, it has already turned out to be a nightmare for the 
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Istanbullu.200
By making political and economic connections, it is not very difficult to predict the 
future of Istanbul. Recently, the media in Turkey mentioned the construction of a third bridge 
in Istanbul to connect the city from the north. As north of Istanbul is presently still a forested 
area and since it is public land, it does not require much imagination to assume that the last 
piece of forest in Istanbul might be gone with the bridge and the linking highway 
construction. 
 There is also the inefficiency of governments to include all groups of the 
society in the decision-making process; as Taylor and Williams already mentioned, the lack 
of direct political involvement of the masses may turn democracies into dictatorships. Even 
though it is not within the scope of this paper, it is hereby mentioned that the lack of direct 
involvement in politics and decision-making also may cause the neglected people to orient 
toward other power groups and be a subject of other power groups.  As a result, the burden of 
the rapid economic growth of a group of people in Turkey has been put on the shoulders of 
the masses and the cities.   
From a more global and cultural perspective, informal solutions to solve the housing 
problem is not likely to fade away easily due to transmitting of worldviews to new 
generations. Whenever a baby is born in a “slum” neighborhood in the 
developing/underdeveloped world, just like elsewhere the existing worldviews, beliefs, 
symbols, and myths together with the survival patterns in the city will be transmitted to the 
newborn. Therefore the way the newborn will comprehend the conditions will be different 
than someone from outside his locale. Durkheim once stated that for the church-member the 
                                                 
200 “Istanbullu” means one who is from Istanbul in Turkish.  
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beliefs and practices of his religious life were already there for him when he was born and if 
these beliefs and practices existed before him, they were external to him.201 Hence, whether 
these conditions are named as “politics,” “economics,” “religion,” “custom,” or “law,” they 
are all external to the individual whose comprehension of these conditions depend on where 
he/she was born. To this point, cities have been hosting two-thirds of the global population 
growth as the target destinations since 1950202 and witnessing the emergence of more than 
200,000 so called slums203
Gecekondu as a housing problem and informal economic activities (carried out by the 
displaced workforce) can be a stage in Turkey’s socio-economic development. However, the 
liberal policies of the Post-Second World War Era demonstrated that neither  
pardoning/legitimizing the existing gecekondu dwellings nor giving local authorities more 
power to deal with this matter could not prevent the expansion of the informal housing and 
economic sector. Furthermore, it is not hard to predict that legitimizing squatters will not 
improve their existing physical quality. Therefore, instead of giving power to the 
municipalities, the regulations should have formulated different solution mechanisms to the 
gecekondu problem and provided a direct connection with the ones that are in need and that 
 in their landscape. When Durkheim’s notion of externality is 
applied to the current trend of informal settlements -the most distinctive feature of the cities 
in the developing world- the existing patterns of life is likely to shape the next generations as 
well.  Therefore, unless a major social change occurs that would make a sharp break with the 
past, it would not be very wrong to make a prediction that the sprawl of gecekondu 
neighborhoods is likely to continue or get even worse.  
                                                 
201 Durkheim, p.64. 
202 Davis, pp.1-2. 
203 Davis,  p.26.  
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are taking advantage of gecekondu housing. These mechanisms could range from making 
more investment in the Turkish countryside, in relation to each region’s socio-economic 
activity, to creating job opportunities for the new urban residents. In addition, since the 
literacy rates are lower in rural Turkey than that of urban, the ways to attract intellectuals and 
more literate groups to reside in the countryside should be explored; for example, activities 
such as cultural tourism (since Asia Minor is very rich in terms of historical ruins from 
ancient civilizations), or organic agriculture can be promoted for the regions of Central 
Anatolia, Black Sea and the Eastern Anatolia.  
To conclude, this thesis attempted to clarify how various development processes of 
different scopes and scales that were not actively related to urban planning of Istanbul from 
1945 to 1960 resulted in with the growth of the gecekondu neighborhoods and informal urban 
economy following World War II.   
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